Subjects: Psychology >> Management Psychology submitted time 2021-10-28
Abstract： The realisation of high-quality and sustainable development of a social economy depends on the guidance, support and guarantee of the talents with sustainable career abilities. The present study comprehensively considers the linkages between occupations and daily work behaviours and explores the potential motivations, paths and intervention mechanisms for individuals to gain sustainable competitive advantages through daily work. First, we define the concept and measurement structure of career sustainability, and reveal its influencing factors, dynamic development mechanisms and the effects that may have on proactive occupational behaviours. Second, based on the conservation of resource theory and social cognitive theory, we explore the interactive influences between career sustainability and employees’ job crafting behaviours. Third, from the perspective of sustainable career, this study explores the vertical intervention mechanisms of organisations on individuals’ job crafting behaviour. Strategies for individuals to achieve sustainable career development and for organisations to carry out career management which is beneficial to both organisations and employees are discussed.
Subjects: Psychology >> Social Psychology Subjects: Psychology >> Management Psychology Subjects: Psychology >> Applied Psychology submitted time 2021-04-02
Abstract： Normative misperception refers to the cognitive bias between an individual’s normative perception and people’s true views of the behaviors or attitudes of others. The occurrence of normative misperception has been proven to be universal, and it occurs when people mistakenly estimate the benefit of a certain attitude and/or behavior. Scholars have begun to draw on normative misperception to explain humans’ social behavior. However, whether different types of norm misperception (behavioral vs. attitudinal misperception) have different effects on behavior, and whether different normative information (descriptive vs. injunctive normative information) diverges in alleviating the normative misperception and its influence on behavior remain unclear. We also ask whether the theory of impression management could be applied to normative misperception in exploring the psychological mechanism underlying its impact on behavior. The current study aims to address these issues with food waste in dining out as the target behavior. Study 1 was a correlational study based a survey carried out among residents from six provinces situated in the western, central, and eastern regions of China. We measured the independent variables (behavioral misperception and attitudinal misperception), dependent variable (food wasting behavior during the most recent eating out), and mediators (three dimensions of impression evaluation: sociability, morality, and competence) with scales developed in previous literature. After excluding outliers and participants who failed the attention check question, we collected 957 valid data. In study 2, two two-factorial experiments (descriptive normative vs. non-normative information in experiment 1; injunctive normative vs. non-normative information in experiment 2) were conducted to test the effects of descriptive (injunctive) normative information on behavioral (attitudinal) misperception. We also ran bootstrap analysis separately for each set of data to determine the relationship among normative information, misperception, impression evaluation, and food wasting behavior. The results of study 1 showed that participants tended to overestimate others’ food waste and their approval of wasteful behavior, and both misperceptions had significant positive effects on food waste, implying that these misperceptions not only exist, but also promote people’s food wasting behavior further. The t-test revealed a greater effect on attitudinal misperception as opposed to behavioral misperception on food waste. In addition, as speculated, the sociability dimension of impression evaluation mediated the relationship between both misperceptions and wasteful behavior, whereas the mediating role of morality and competence were not significant. In other words, because participants overestimated others’ wasteful behavior and their degree of approval, they worried that being too economical in public might be considered as being stingy or indecent, and this worry further bred wasteful behavior. Study 2 confirmed the difference between the mechanisms underlying the two types of normative information: descriptive normative information reduced the behavioral misperception itself, creating a new normative perception among the participants and prompting them to switch from complying with the original norm (people generally waste food) to adhering to the new one (people’s wasteful behavior is not as common as imagined), which mitigated misperception’s negative effect on wasteful behavior. On the contrary, injunctive normative information did not decrease the attitudinal misperception itself but rather moderated the relationship between the misperception and behavior: misperception still existed, but its prescriptive power declined. The findings of this study highlight the importance of considering the distinction between the two types of normative misperception in social norm campaigns, and suggest two possible ways of correcting people’s normative misperception: providing descriptive normative information to decrease people’s behavioral misperception and providing injunctive normative information to ameliorate attitudinal misperception’s detrimental effect on behavior. "
Subjects: Psychology >> Social Psychology Subjects: Psychology >> Management Psychology Subjects: Psychology >> Applied Psychology submitted time 2021-03-04
Abstract： A large body of experimental evidence demonstrates that in presence of third-party punishers, cooperators can gain higher payoffs than defectors. As a result, third-party punishment (TPP) that changes the payoff structure of defectors is believed to be a key in promoting cooperation. However, this rationale is contrary to an important finding in behavioral economics: individuals are not necessarily rational decision makers and do not have purely self-regarding preferences. This contradiction raises an interesting question: can this finding also be applied to defectors? We aim to explore this question through three experiments. In Experiment 1, 240 undergraduates participated in a Public Goods Game and were divided randomly into three conditions: control condition (CC), low defection cost condition (LC), and high defection cost condition (HC). In each round of the game, participants in CC decided whether to contribute 10 tokens from the initial endowment to the public account. All the tokens contributed to the public account were doubled and evenly allocated to all group members. Participants who retained 10 tokens needed to pay a tax of 1 token. The procedures in LC and HC were identical to that in CC. An exception is that in LC and HC, independent punishers could discipline defectors by paying 5 tokens to reduce the payoff of defectors by 1 token in LC and 10 tokens in HC. In Experiment 2, 179 participants who defected in Stage 1 were selected as sample in Stage 2 and were divided randomly into two conditions: CC (89 participants) and punishment condition (PC, 90 participants). Participants in PC were told they had been punished in Stage 1, whereas those in CC received no feedback. All participants’ levels of norm activation and cooperation in different games were then measured. Experiment 2 was replicated in Experiment 3, where the participants were not game players but spectators, and their levels of norm activation and cooperation were measured before and after the game. The participants in defection condition observed a defection and the consequent punishment, whereas those in norm condition observed a fair offer and no punishment. In Experiment 1, the defection cost in LC was lower than that in CC, so participants in LC had a stronger incentive to defect. However, the results revealed a significantly higher cooperation level in LC. A plausible explanation is that the defection cost in form of punishment served as a norm reminder, but cost in form of tax lacked this function, implying that even defectors are not necessarily benefit maximizers. The results of Experiment 2 confirmed this explanation: compared with unpunished defectors, the punished ones manifested a higher level of norm activation. The bootstrap analysis showed that the norm activation completely mediated TPP and cooperation. Experiment 2 also found a spillover effect of TPP: the punished defectors still demonstrated a high cooperation in a new different game where the sanction was absent. Finally, Experiment 3 found another spillover effect of TPP: bystanders who did not experience the punishment in person but witnessed it showed a significantly higher cooperation in subsequent interactions. In conclusion, oftentimes, people defect simply because they are unaware of the existence of a certain norm, and activating people’s norms through TPP can significantly reduce their selfish behaviors. In addition to being an economic means to reduce defectors’ payoff, TPP serves as a norm reminder. The two spillover effects found in this study suggest that TPP as a means of norm activation may be more efficient than as an economic means because of its cost-effectiveness. These findings shed new light on the understanding of extensive cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals. "
Subjects: Psychology >> Experimental Psychology submitted time 2019-01-14
Abstract： " It has been widely recognized that the social order of human societies is largely maintained by social norms. However, we still know little about the cognitive and emotional foundations which shape social norms, making it hard (if not impossible) to understand how social norms are generated and maintained. Prior neural studies, which mainly perform second-party punishment based on the ultimatum framework, rarely explore the relevant brain areas as well as the neural mechanisms of third-party punishment driven by social norms. In the current study, we try to provide evidences which support that two types of mechanisms (i.e., negative emotions and self-interest mechanisms) influence social norms compliance of third-parties with opposite directions. Meanwhile, right dorsolateral prefrontal area (DLPFC) plays a crucial role in this process. In this study, we used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to investigate whether effects of increased or decreased right DLPFC excitability influenced third-party punishment in a dictator game. Following an experimental design of “between-subject (tDCS treatments: anodal, cathodal, sham) × within-subject (cost of punishment treatments: without cost, with cost)”, ninety participants were first randomly assigned to receive either anodal, cathodal, or sham stimulation of 15 min, then they performed two dictator game tasks as third-parties. In Task Ⅰ (without cost) participants did not need to bear any costs for their punishments (none cost task), while in Task Ⅱ (with cost) they were required to pay for their punishment actions. The results are given as follows. We first performed repeated measured ANOVA and one-way ANOVA to examine the effect of tDCS stimulation treatments (anodal, cathodal and sham) on emotion response. We found significant main effects of tDCS on the emotion response. Meanwhile, post hoc analysis (SNK) showed that the anodal stimulation decreased the negative emotions while the cathodal stimulation enhanced the negative emotions. Second, results of repeated measured ANOVA and one-way ANOVA showed significant main effects of tDCS on punishments in the none cost Task Ⅰ, and post hoc analysis (SNK) showed that the cathodal stimulation significantly increased punishments while the results of anodal stimulation were insignificant. Third, We also conducted repeated measured ANOVA and one-way ANOVA to test whether the difference of punishments between two tasks differed in tDCS groups, and found main effects of tDCS were significant. Moreover, post hoc analysis (SNK) showed that the difference of punishments between two tasks was significantly higher in the cathodal stimulation than that in the sham stimulation, while the results of anodal stimulation were insignificant compared to that in the sham stimulation. The present study provides one of the first neural evidences for the role of right DLPFC in third-parties’ social norm compliance, and supports mechanism explanations of negative emotions and self-interest. The outcomes indicate that DLPFC, by affecting the processes of negative emotions and self-interest, is an important brain area of social norm compliance. When third-parties are confronted with violations of social norms, their brain first releases negative emotions, which drives third-parties to punish violators. Further, if third-parties need to pay for their compliance with social norms, their rational goals about self-interest will weaken negative emotional impulses, and finally make their compliance with social norms depends on the trade-offs between negative emotions and self-interest mechanisms. "
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